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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
* * * * * * * *

MARION MARSH,
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Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Appeal No.
Civil No.

SCOTT ALLAN MARSH,
Defendant-Appellant

970696-CA
894891070 DA

(Oral Argument Priority
No: 15)

INTRODUCTION
The statement of jurisdiction, issues presented for review
and standards of review, statement of the case, and facts have
all been previously presented.

(Brief of Appellants) Appellants

present this brief in reply to issues raised by the Appellee in
its brief.
ARGUMENT

Point I. A MILITARY SEPARATION PAYMENT MADE UNDER §1174 AND
RELATED STATUTES IS NOT A PENSION OR RETIREMENT PAYMENT
AND SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS SUCH UNDER A DECREE OF
DIVORCE.
Separation pay from the military is not a retirement payment
and should not be treated as retirement under A Decree of
Divorce.

The applicable portion of the August 16, 1989 Divorce

Decree awarded Marion Marsh "ll/40ths of all pension and
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retirement benefits that the [Mr. Marsh] may receive upon his
retirement from military service."

Appellee contends that since

"marital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived" including pension funds and insurance," Gardner
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)(quoting Englert v.
Enqlert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978)), this is intended to include
military separation pay.
Appellee continues that "the essential criterion is whether
a right to the benefit has accrued in whole or in part during the
marriage."

Mr. Marsh did not earn his separation "in whole or in

part" during the marriage.

He earned the separation pay when he

was involuntarily separated from the military in November 1991.
At that time he was given the separation pay to assist him in his
re-entry into civilian life.
Under the statute, 10 U.S.C. §1174(h), in the event that
the individual receiving separation pay eventually qualifies for
retirement, the amount of the separation pay must be repaid.

The

statute does not state that this is an advancement on retirement
as the Appellee implies or as her expert opines.

The statute

provides only that if the individual receives Retirement he must
repay the separation pay.

Appellee also raises the issue of

the entry of the separation pay as Retirement/Pension on Mr.
Marsh's W-2 form.

Tax forms do not contain a place to enter
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Military Separation Pay and according to Mr. Crist, Appellee's
Expert Witness, the Retirement/Pension line is where Mr. Marsh
was likely instructed to list that amount.
The Appellee implies that since Mr. Marsh has completed his
requisite years of service with the military that he is entitled
to retirement.

What she fails to address, however, is that Mr.

Marsh still must live to the age of 65 before he becomes eligible
for any retirement benefits.

If he receives these benefits, then

at that time, Mrs. Marsh will be entitled to ll/40ths of the
retirement.
Because Mr. Marsh turning age 65 was the agreed upon time
that Mrs. Marsh would receive retirement, based upon current
information she will, at that time, receive ll/40ths of the total
$1800 which totals $495 per month.

With Mr. Marsh repaying 75%

of the retirement, he will receive $495 each month which can be
paid to Mrs. Marsh to compensate her accordingly.

This appears

to be the appropriate solution because Appellee is only entitled
to the retirement if Mr. Marsh completes the requisite years of
service and if he reaches retirement age.

If he does not meet

these requirements, he will not receive retirement benefits and
should not be required to pay benefits to Mrs. Marsh prior to
receiving them.
Appellee argues that without the separation pay she will
suffer "an enormous hardship and injustice."
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Because the Divorce

Decree granted the retirement only should Mr. Marsh receive it,
she has no interest in that retirement until that time.

Mr.

Marsh is not arguing that Appellee is not entitled to her
ll/40ths of the retirement, only that she be given her share of
the benefits if and when he receives them.
Although Appellee argues that Appellant "will receive
retirement benefits," that is not the case.

Although he has

currently completed the requisite years of service, he has not
reached the age of 65 and will not reach that age for a number of
years.

His retirement is contingent upon his reaching that age

and is not, as Appellee states, a foregone conclusion.
Appellee indicated that in the case of Kuzmiak v. Kuzmiak,
222 Cal. Rptr. 644, (Cal. App. 2d 1986), cert, denied 479 U.S.
885, the employee had not completed 20 years of service to
entitle him to retirement and as noted, Mr. Marsh has currently
completed the requisite years of service.

However, as noted

above Mr. Marsh has not "earned his longevity pension" because he
is not entitled to such pension unless or until he reaches the
age of 65.
Since separation pay is generally separate property,
Appellee is not entitled to receive ll/40ths of the separation
pay.

Since Mr. Marsh has currently fulfilled his requisite years

of service he is one step closer to receiving retirement.
However, he is not entitled to receive those retirement benefits
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unless or until he reaches the age of 65.

Should that event

occur, Appellee will then be entitled to receive her ll/40ths of
the retirement pay.

Since the amount paid to Mr. Marsh was

separation pay as a part of his involuntary discharge, the
reasoning used in the Kuzmiak case should be applied to determine
that separation pay is not compensation for past services and is
consequently not divisible in the divorce decree.

POINT II.

IF APPELLEE RECEIVES 11/40THS OF THE MILITARY
SEPARATION PAY SHE MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE
REPAYMENT IN THE EVENT THAT MR. MARSH RECEIVES HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

Equity requires that Mrs. Marsh be required to participate
in the repayment if she receives part of the separation pay.

If

she receives her ll/40ths of the separation pay, she should be
required to repay ll/40ths when and if she receives retirement
benefits.

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
OBLIGATION FOR MR. MARSH TO HOLD APPELLEE HARMLESS
ON THE MORTGAGE WAS CONTINGENT ON HIS PAYMENT OF
CHILD SUPPORT.

The Decree of Divorce awarded child support and alimony to
Appellee.

The Decree also ordered Appellee to hold Appellant

harmless on the mortgage for their marital home. As a result of
Appellee's failure to do so, Mr. Marsh or someone on his behalf
must repay the Department of Veteran's Affairs the sum of

5

$12,870.96 before the Appellant can once again be eligible for
Veteran's loans. Although, as Appellee noted, "the outstanding
debt on the home was waived by the Veteran's Administration,'' Mr.
Marsh has been damaged and not held harmless in that he is
precluded from obtaining any type of Veteran's loans until this
amount is paid off.
As courts have found in child support and visitation cases,
separate obligations such as visitation and child support are not
contingent upon one another.

In addition, the Divorce Decree

expressly provided Mrs. Marsh a remedy in the event of an
arrearage in support payments.

The Decree states "if the

Defendant falls thirty (30) days or more in arrears in his child
support obligation, the Plaintiff should be entitled to mandatory
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (7845(d) (1) et. seq.) (1984 as amended)."

The Decree does not permit

or provide her justification to evade her obligations under the
Decree nor does it make meeting her obligations contingent upon
his.
In addition, Appellee failed to note that as of the date of
trial, Mr. Marsh had paid all his arrearages, including interest,
and has made Mrs. Marsh whole. Mr. Marsh is entitled to the
same.

It is Appellee's obligation to make Mr. Marsh whole by

repaying the debt of $12,870.96. Mr. Marsh has remained current
in his support.

He has fulfilled all his obligations under the
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Divorce Decree and is entitled to the same fulfillment of
obligations from Mrs. Marsh.

It would be inequitable to require

Mr. Marsh to remain current on his obligations and not require
the same from Appellee.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the
trial court and enter judgment in favor of Mr. Marsh since
Military Separation Pay is not the same as retirement and
consequently should not be divided as retirement under the decree
of divorce.

In the alternative, if the Separation pay is divided

under the Decree, Appellee should be required to contribute to
the repayment of such in the event of Mr. Marsh receiving
retirement.

Finally, Appellee should be required to uphold her

Dbligation to hold Mr. Marsh harmless on their mortgage and
should be required to repay the Veteran's Affairs loan so that
yir. Marsh is again made whole and has the opportunity to again
obtain a Veteran's Affairs loan.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this luftj

Day of August, 1998.

RICHARD N. BIGELOW

By:
Richard K. Bigelow (39&I/)
Attorney for Appellant
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